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The OBOR (One Belt, One Road) Initiative, also known as the “New 
Silk Road”, was revealed in the second semester of 2013 by the Chinese 
President Xi Jinping. It is the most ambitious Chinese project towards 
the country’s international insertion. As highlighted by Yiwei (2016), this 
project presents itself as an alternative to the American way of conducting 
the process of globalization, which he sees as unsustainable. 
Regardless of the official rhetoric, it is a fact that such initiative has 
the potential to establish a new order not only in Eurasia, but also in the 
entire international system. Despite the contradictions which divide the 
rhetoric from the practices, the intentions from the reality, it seems plausible 
to suggest that the Chinese insertion strategy differs from the strategy 
adopted by the United States. Beyond its willingness to shed light on such 
background issues, the present academic paper aims at understanding how 
the Chinese diplomacy has been trying to adjust its OBOR Initiative to its 
policy towards Africa. All in all, it intends to perceive how the re-emergence 
of Asia, with China in its center core, is shaping the systemic transition 
(Arrighi 2008, 17).
For this purpose, in the first section of the paper, the main elements 
of the Chinese international insertion, which is progressively getting more 
assertive, are presented. In the second one, there is an explanation on the 
features of the New Silk Road, as well as on the capabilities and objectives of 
its implementation. In the third part of the text, we revisit a few core aspects 
of the Chinese policy towards Africa, looking forward to understanding 
eventually which is the role of the continent within the new maritime Silk 
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China: From National Reconstruction to Global Assertiveness
When the New China emerged, after the Revolution of 1949, it paved 
the way to a multifaceted and sinuous process of national reconstruction. 
The first generation of leaders, led by Mao Zedong, turned the country into 
an independent nation, resumed territorial integration and established 
the landmarks to base industries and infrastructure (transportation, 
communications and energy). The second generation, whose leader was 
Deng Xiaoping, shaped the Chinese economic reform in the mid-1970s, 
which opened the country to the world, resumed the process of accelerated 
growth, internalized technology, reduced the gap in terms of the developed 
countries and created a new institutional framework to the country. The 
third generation, under Jiang Zemin’s  administration (1993-2003), had 
to face two challenges: (i) resist the situation resulting from the collapse 
of the Soviet sphere of influence; (ii) and not only maintain the measures 
proposed by Deng, but also strengthen them.
From the twenty-first century onwards, along with Hu Jintao’s 
fourth generation (2003-2013) and with Xi Jinping’s fifth’s (2013-present), 
the Chinese international projection acquired new shapes. As stated by 
Visentini (2011, 131), if the consolidation of the New China represented 
the recovery of the country’s sovereignty and the establishment of the 
landmarks for the further national development, a “Brand New” China, 
after the Reforms, begins to transform the international order itself. The 
challenges faced by China are complicated, since the country has to deal not 
only with the contradictions of the Post-Cold War world, but also with the 
aging of the contemporary capitalism and its historical cores.
Alongside the process of national solidification, China started to 
exert a more important role within international organizations, as it is the 
example of the country’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 
and the more significant role it started to play within the IMF. Besides, 
Chinese leadership towards regional integration is also worth pointing out. 
According to Zhao (2013), Chinese diplomacy became more assertive over 
time, giving up on Deng’s traditional low-profile foreign policy, especially 
when it comes to crucial matters of national interest, such as the country’s 
presence in Africa and security issues involving the South China Sea. China 
has been building objective and subjective conditions in order to develop an 
active multilateral diplomacy, giving up on its supporting player condition 
to exert a leading figure and to take on great responsibilities (Tianquan 
2012, 182).
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 Towards this direction, regional assertiveness and activism are 
preconditions to consolidate the Chinese role as a superpower. That is why 
conducting and leading the processes of regional integration is so important, 
be it towards the Pacific (ASEAN Plus Three and Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership, also called ASEAN+6) or towards Eurasia (Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization). The New Mainland and Maritime Silk Road 
(One Belt, One Road), let on by the Chinese government, intends to set the 
infrastructure and the political plea to integrate the entire region of Eurasia. 
In other words, the argument that China is rebuilding a “sinocentric” 
system is getting stronger (Pautasso 2011).
Hence, it is clear that China has been proclaiming a rhetoric that 
aims at legitimizing its rise. Firstly, the concept of Peaceful Rise, forged by 
Zheng Bijan, a prominent member of the Communist Party of China, in 
2002. This concept was also created as a response to the frequent assertions 
of “Chinese threat” or “Chinese breakdown”. However, the concept was 
rejected, among other reasons, because it would arouse mistrust among 
neighboring countries due to the notion of “rise”. According to (Tianquan 
2012, 188), in 2007, a Report by the 17th Congress of the Communist Party of 
China adopted the idea of Peaceful Development and Harmonious World.
In 2004, the British writer Joshua Ramo introduced the notion 
of the Beijing Consensus. According to it, China has been performing an 
alternative path based not only on the recognition local development needs of 
each country, but also on the recognition of multilateralism and cooperation 
as a way to build a new world order (Arrighi 2008, 383). In spite of the fact 
that this concept was not forged by the Chinese elite, the Chinese model – 
characterized by intense State presence in development matters and based 
upon the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (1955) – is perceived as 
different and even divergent from the neoliberal supremacy enshrined in 
the Washington Consensus and from the widespread interventionism of 
the US. 
Recently, the Chinese elite has been highlighting the idea of the 
“Chinese Dream”. This concept is conceived as the country’s rejuvenation, 
as well as the revitalization and renewal of its civilization, in order to promote 
transformation and to materialize development. The Chinese dream is 
intertwined with the “bicentenary agenda” (the creation of the CPC in 1921 
and the proclamation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949), which 
establishes the baselines for the construction of a country and of a society 
modestly comfortable. 
It is evident, therefore, that China is searching for concepts and 
frameworks capable of providing identity to the country’s foreign insertion. 
It does so as a reaction to concepts such as the “Chinese Threat”, arranging 
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alternative paths to the global governance patterns of the United States and 
its European allies. However, it not about a conceptual ‘dispute’; the Chinese 
journey itself has always been contrasted by the Western. As highlighted 
by Losurdo (2016), in China, the Welfare State is being built facing the 
challenges that only a continental-size country with more than 1.3 billion 
inhabitants, wide social mobility and enlargement of the middle class – not 
to mention the setback in regional inequalities – could face. On the other 
hand, in the West, while social and regional polarization arise, social rights 
are going through a process of dismantling. In this sense, development is 
imperative to the legitimacy of the regime, to national sovereignty and to the 
autonomous international insertion of this Asian country (Losurdo 2016, 
343). 
China’s New Silk Road policy and strategy
After being announced by Xi Jinping in 2013, the New Silk Road 
was given a document issued by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and by the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC), whose title was Vision and Actions on Jointly 
Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road2. The 
document emphasizes that, more than two millenniums ago, peoples of 
Asia, Europe and Africa were integrated by the Silk Road. According to the 
Chinese government, the New Silk Road seeks for the following elements 
of cooperation: political coordination, facilities connectivity, unobstructed 
trade, financial integration and people exchange. In order to make it happen, 
the main objectives are to align and coordinate this countries’ development 
strategies; to create demand and job opportunities; and to promote trust, 
peace and prosperity. The plan explicits the availability of the Chinese 
government in handling higher responsibilities and obligations – according 
to its possibilities – and in promoting the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence. As reported by the document, the New Route subdivides itself 
into the Economic Belt, linking China–Central Asia–Russia– Europe (Baltic 
states); and the Maritime Route, developed to sail from the Chinese coast 
to Europe, going across the South China Sea and across the Indian Ocean, 
by one route, and from the Chinese coast, across the South China Sea and 
towards the South Pacific by the other one (Figure 1).
2 See the original document on the official website of the Chinese government http://
en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html. 
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Figure 1 - Economic Belt of the original Silk Road and of the New Maritime 
Silk Road  
Figure 1: Economic Belt of the original Silk Road and of the New Maritime Silk Road 
 
Source: Resource Reports. 
 
The project of the New Silk Road is structured upon 6 corridors: (i) Economic 
Corridor China–Mongolia–Russia; (ii) New Eurasian Land Bridge; (iii) Economic 
Corridor China–Central Asia; (iv) Economic Corridor China–Indochinese Peninsula; 
and (v) Maritime Economic Corridor. Such integration process would involve around 
65 countries and 63% percent of the global population of three continents (Asia, Europe 
and Africa). The main idea behind this endeavor is the rejuvenation and integration of 
Eurasia, a region once referred to as the World Island by Mackinder, involving several 
civilizations (Chinese, Arabic, Persian, Indian) and several religions (from Islam to 
Christianity), always avoiding the expansionist model and the colonialism adopted by 
the Western powers (Yiwei 2016, 187-188). 
The Chinese strategy of the New Silk Road seems a fair project, since it is based 
upon the exploitation of the main capacities available to the Asian country. The first one  
is the Chinese productive capacity, which includes an enormous base industry: steel 
production is a clear example, as China completed 2014 with a production of almost 
823 million tons, against 110,7 from Japan and 88,3 from the United States3. The 
second one is the country’s giant port infrastructure, owing 7 out of 10 of the world's 
biggest4 ports and 21 out of the 100 world’s biggest construction companies (only 8 of 
                                                          
3 See Valor’s news “Produção global de aço cresce 1,2% no mundo e cai 0,7% no Brasil” on: 
http://www.valor.com.br/empresas/3873604/producao-global-de-aco-cresce-12-no-mundo-e-cai-07-no-
brasil.  
4See the ranking on the website World Shipping Council: http://www.worldshipping.org/about-the-
industry/global-trade/top-50-world-container-ports.    
Source: Resource rts.
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is the country’s giant port infrastructure, owing 7 out of 10 of the world’s 
biggest4 ports and 21 out of the 100 world’s biggest construction companies 
(only 8 of them are Japanese and 7 American)5. Last but not least, China has 
been mobilizing its financial capacities to boost the integration conceived 
by the New Silk Road. It is worth mentioning the creation of the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the BRICS’ New Development 
Bank, the establishment of a financial institution owned by the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Silk Road Fund, and the Chinese 
banks themselves. In other words, such financial capacity works not only as 
a way to leverage the country’s international insertion, but also as a tool to 
pressure the emergence of a new financial and geo-economic architecture 
in a global scale.
In this sense, the New Silk Road enunciates three fundamental 
goals of the Chinese government, namely its economic capacity, its foreign 
policy strategies and its financial reserves. These three goals may intertwine 
with the shaping of a new financial and geo-economic architecture. Firstly, 
the Chinese government has been pointing out, since the 2008 financial 
crisis, the necessity to overcome its vulnerabilities of an economy anchored 
upon the dollar and pressured to make its own currency part of IMF’s 
currency basket – as it started to happen in 2016, when the yuan began to 
represent 10,92% of such basket, behind the dollar (41,7%) and the euro 
(30,9%), and ahead of the pound (8,1%) and the yen (8,3%)6. Secondly, there 
is the BRICS’ initiative that created the New Development Bank and the 
Contingent Reserves Agreement in the 6th Summit of the group, in July 
20147. Thirdly, China widened its role as global infrastructure financier 
through China Development Bank (CDB) and Exim Bank, both established 
in 1994 as State development banks. Fourthly, there is the growth in foreign 
direct investments and contracts in China8 – what explains the fast-track 
enlargement of the number of Chinese companies in the Fortune’s list of the 
http://www.valor.com.br/empresas/3873604/producao-global-de-aco-cresce-12-no-mundo-
e-cai-07-no-brasil. 
4 See the ranking on the website World Shipping Council: http://www.worldshipping.org/
about-the-industry/global-trade/top-50-world-container-ports.   
5 See the ranking of the world’s biggest construction companies: http://www.enr.com/
toplists/2015_Top_250_International_Contractors1.
6 See Estadão’s news: “Entrada do yuan na cesta do FMI ocorrerá em outubro de 2016” on: 
http://br.china-embassy.org/por/szxw/t1250761.htm  
7 See note published by the Chinese Embassy in Brazil “Chinese Premier asks the U.S. to 
approve reform of IMF’s quotas”, March the 31st 2015, available on: http://br.china-embassy.
org/por/szxw/t1250761.htm 
8 See detailed research on: http://www.heritage.org/research/projects/china-global-
investment-tracker-interactive-map. 
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500 greatest companies in the world to 106 in 20159. Fifthly, the government 
created an international payment system (China International Payment 
System – CIPS) in October 201510, an alternative to the Western dominant 
SWIFT (Society for the Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication). 
Hence, the Chinese government works towards the global de-dollarization 
and the internationalization of its own currency, the yuan, looking forward 
to enlarge its autonomy towards the financial market centered in the 
U.S. and in the European Union. All in all, the dialectic between power 
and capital has been shaping the contemporary international system and, 
therefore, it is worth understanding how the American hegemony has been 
built from Bretton Woods onwards and considering the signs which point 
towards the fact that significant changes are occurring in the international 
sphere (Pautasso 2015). 
And what could turn the OBOR initiative into a feasible project? 
In the first place, it must be kept in mind that the answer does not involve 
complex institutional arrangements of integration, which premises huge 
concessions and consensus. Secondly, its feasibility is being driven by 
a single, almost irrefutable objective: the interest of the countries in 
infrastructure. Thirdly, once confirmed the feasibility of the project – 
coming from the capacities available to China (base industry, engineering, 
financing, etc.) –, trade flows get consolidated, allowing the exercise of its 
economic gravitational power. At last, the economic power generates the 
legitimacy needed to explore the political power, which may progressively 
displace the American hegemony by integrating Eurasia.
Africa in the context of the Chinese foreign policy
The collapse of the soviet socialism has had a much more significant 
impact to international relations and to the international society than it is 
usually credited. The neoliberal offensive and the American expansionism, 
shown by a unilateral and interventionist foreign policy, may be its most 
apparent facets. However, its developments are perceived in the contemporary 
scenario still. When it comes to China and the African continent, the situation 
is not much different.  
In Africa, even though the cessation of the conventional conflicts 
led by the superpowers (USA and USSR) have had a positive outcome, the 
end of the Cold War has at the very least changed the political orientation of 
9 See China Daily “More Chinese firms in Fortune 500” on: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
business/2016-07/20/content_26161051.htm.   




progressive governments which emerged from national liberation struggles. 
The neoliberal adjustments have disarticulated the recent-born African states, 
leading, eventually, to economic and institutional setbacks. The outcome was 
a marginalization of the continent in the field of international relations whilst 
identity conflicts, misery and epidemics took over (Visentini 2010, 155).
To China, the repression faced at Tiananmen Square has granted 
the maintenance of the regime and of Deng’s reforms, whilst the rest of the 
socialist countries were in the process of disintegration, diving into a decade 
of regression due to neoliberal shock therapies. Still, the approach with Africa 
was a crucial part of the Chinese strategy, not only as a way to break the siege, 
but also as a path to universalize its foreign policy and widen the economic 
synergy which had been feeding its economic dynamism.
From the mid-nineties onwards, the mutual efforts between China 
and African nations has increased. Chinese trade with the African continent 
surpassed US$174 billion in 2014. Around 4.2% of Chinese exports have 
Africa as destiny and around 4.8% of the country’s imports come from 
this very same continent11. In 2009, Chinese-African trade – which, in 
1992, comprehended only 1.3 billion – had already overcame the transacted 
amount between the U.S. and the African continent. The growth in trade 
flow taxes, however, is a result of a multi-approach interaction which has 
been institutionalized behind the creation of the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC).
FOCAC was formally established in 2000 and comprehends China 
and 50 other African nations. The Ministerial Conference occurs every three 
years and aims at intensifying China-Africa cooperation, using several other 
forums which deal with agriculture, science and technology, law, finance, 
culture, reflection groups, youth, NGOs, women debate, media and local 
governance, etc. Throughout this period, a great amount of documents have 
been signed, with a special note to Addis Ababa Action Agenda (2004-2006), 
whose goals were to increase assistance to African countries and to provide 
them tax-free exports to China when coming from least developed African 
nations. Every new summit, the Forum develops a new Action Plan – to be 
implemented in the subsequent period (Action Plan towards Cooperation-
Beijing China-Africa 2007-2009; Sharm el-Sheikh Action Plan 2010-
2012; Beijing Cooperation Action Plan 2013-2015). Moreover, the Chinese 
government has been extending billionaire credit lines to several sectors of the 
African economy12. In other words, FOCAC strengthens the bilateral relations 
of China with African countries, achieving natural resources, new markets 
and investment opportunities, while cultivating African states’ commitment 
to China within International Organizations (Lopes, Daniele and Javier 2013). 
Such institutionalization of Chinese-African relations boosts several 
11 See Chinese trade statistics. The source is the Observatory of Economic Complexity, 
available on: http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/chn/#Destinations.
12 See further details on FOCAC’S website: http://www.focac.org/eng/ltda/ltjj/t933522.htm. 
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other initiatives. Firstly, it has increased Chinese international aid in Africa, 
providing professional training, technical cooperation, humanitarian aid, etc. 
Secondly, the continent’s infrastructural development has shown substantial 
progress behind the construction of public buildings, power generation 
plants, highways, schools, agriculture development sites, hospitals, etc. 
Thirdly, Chinese foreign direct investment has stimulated Special Economic 
Zones and Free Trade Zones in several African countries, compensating for 
the unemployment generated by Chinese exports. As highlighted by Visentini 
(2014), such features are the very expression of South-South Cooperation and 
are contributing to the creation of a meridional geopolitical scenario based 
upon the spirit of the Bandung Conference. In other words, Bandung, the 
Non-Aligned Movement and the G-77 have established the foundation basis of 
South-South relations, as well as its organization around common principles, 
values and ideas (Pereira and Medeiros 2015). 
It is evident, therefore, that China’s African policy is driven by its 
self-interest and its own political and strategic considerations. However, it is 
extremely different from the Western rhetoric which constantly characterizes 
it as “Chinese imperialism”.  Although the earnings, the benefits and the 
capacities are indeed asymmetric, Chinese relations with African countries 
do not involve territorial control, military interventionism, interference on 
economic management, ethnocentrism on political organizations, imposition 
of cultural patterns, etc. – which are clear facets of nineteenth and twentieth 
century imperialism.
Africa and the New Maritime Silk Road
Persuasively, China is combining its rhetoric and capabilities to 
put forth the OBOR Initiative. According to Yiwei (2016, 15-60), the New 
Maritime Silk Road throws out the path previously adopted by Western 
powers – which promoted expansion, conflict and colonization –, choosing in 
favor of a new maritime civilization, in which there is the integration of men 
and seas, harmonious coexistence and sustainable development.
For this purpose, China aims at establishing ties between the main 
markets of the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa. The New Maritime Silk 
Road is dedicated to consolidate port infrastructure in order to strengthen 
commercial and energetic corridors that go through the South China Sea, the 
Persian Gulf and the Red Sea, encompassing Peninsulas such as Indochina, 
Hindustan, Arabia and the Horn of Africa. It is a way of increasing Chinese 
presence in the face of the existing chokepoints of the region, such as the 
Strait of Bab el-Mandeb, between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, the Strait 
of Ormuz, between the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, and the Strait of 
Malacca, between the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea.
127
Diego Pautasso
Regarding the African continent, Northeast Africa and the Horn of 
Africa are the other pole of the maritime connection provided by the OBOR 
Initiative. The position of countries such as Egypt, Djibouti and Kenya reveals 
the role of the Horn of Africa as the other pole of the New Maritime Silk 
Road. This region may potentialize Chinese policies towards Africa (Figure 
2). Furthermore, much of the Chinese experience behind the New Silk 
Road, based upon infrastructure buildup as a way to boost new fluxes and 
partnerships, has been shaped through Sino-African relations.
Figure 2: Africa and the New Maritime Silk Road
 
Source: Mercator Institute for China’s Studies 
 
Therefore, Egypt is particularly crucial for the New Maritime Silk Road, since 
the Suez Canal is the main transit spot between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean 
Sea. When visiting this African country in January 2016, Xi Jinping encouraged 
Chinese companies to take part in big projects in the country, such as the development 
of the New Suez Canal and the construction of a new administrative capital outside 
Cairo13. 
Djibouti’s case is no different, strategically located between the Red Sea and the 
Gulf of Aden. In spite of its small size, the country is very important in the framework 
of the New Maritime Silk Road, sheltering the first Chinese ultramarine naval base –  
where the United States already have the Pentagon's African Command (AFRICOM), 
used for CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) drone operations. The alleged goal of the 
Chinese government is to deploy facilities able to provide logistic support to efforts 
against piracy, humanitarian assistance and peace maintenance. Although China insists 
on denying the term “military base”, it is clear the willingness of the country in building 
a Marine capable of operating in worldwide global waters – supported by its first air 
carrier, the so-called “Liaoning”14. 
In the same way, in Kenya, the Chinese government has settled a deal in order to 
build the Port of Lamu. The objective is to integrate South Sudan and Ethiopia through 
other infrastructure operations, including roadways, railways, airports, oil refineries and 
fiber optic cables. Hence, the emerging oil and gas industries from East Africa shall be 
                                                          
13 See Shannon Tiezzi’s article on The Diplomat “Xi’s Visit Cements Egypt’s Place on the ‘Belt 
and Road’ on: http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/xis-visit-cements-egypts-place-on-the-belt-and-road/. 
14 See Sputnik Brazil “China construirá sua 1ª base naval ultramarina perto de base dos EUA no 
Djibouti” on: http://br.sputniknews.com/mundo/20151127/2900669/china-base-baval-ultramarina-eua-
djibouti.html.  
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have the Pentagon’s African Command (AFRICOM), used for CIA (Central 
Intelligence Agency) drone operations. The alleged goal of the Chinese 
government is to deploy facilities able to provide logistic support to efforts 
against piracy, humanitarian assistance and peace maintenance. Although 
China insists on denying the term “military base”, it is clear the willingness 
of the country in building a Marine capable of operating in worldwide global 
waters – supported by its first air carrier, the so-called “Liaoning”14.
In the same way, in Kenya, the Chinese government has settled a deal 
in order to build the Port of Lamu. The objective is to integrate South Sudan 
and Ethiopia through other infrastructure operations, including roadways, 
railways, airports, oil refineries and fiber optic cables. Hence, the emerging 
oil and gas industries from East Africa shall be integrated with Asian markets 
dynamics15. This region is also connected to Chinese interests in Sudan.
In this sense, it is possible to observe that the OBOR Initiative will 
knot together a set of great goals of the Chinese government – which have been 
already described in previous studies (Pautasso 2012). Firstly, it will, in the 
domestic arena, deepen national territorial integration with the establishment 
of a continental economy, since Eastern China develops the maritime “wing” 
of the Route; Western China, the mainland “wing”, connecting more than 10 
Chinese provinces. Secondly, it will also deepen regional integration, further 
strengthening the conditions towards the creation of a Sinocentric system. 
Thirdly, the universalization of Chinese foreign policy, marked by a significant 
presence in Africa, will become a field test for Sino-American disputes, which 
reveals conflicting development models in the current era.
All in all, the New Silk Road is clearly a Chinese strategy towards (i) 
Eurasian integration, (ii) the consolidation of a new Sinocentric system, and 
(iii) the establishment of foundation basis for China to consolidate itself as 
a global superpower. It is, at the same time, both a strategy and a rhetoric to 
legitimize China’s emergence in different patterns from those announced by 
the U.S. in the post-Cold War period. 
Final Considerations
History itself (and history of international relations, for obvious 
14  See Sputnik Brazil “China construirá sua 1ª base naval ultramarina perto de base dos 
EUA no Djibouti” on: http://br.sputniknews.com/mundo/20151127/2900669/china-base-
baval-ultramarina-eua-djibouti.html. 
15  See Estadão’s news: “Grupo chinês firma acordo para construir porto do Quênia” on: 
http://economia.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,grupo-chines-firma-acordo-para-construir-
porto-do-quenia,1537830.   
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reasons) is a contradictory process. The understanding and the reading of 
such contradictions, the forces in dispute, is obfuscated by its involvement 
with the contemporary era. During the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, the world witnessed the rebirth of Africa, the strengthening of 
popular governments in Latin America and the international projection of 
emerging countries – later reunited under the BRICS acronym. There was 
the rehearsal of South-South cooperation movements and the recapture of 
the processes initiated with the decolonization of global periphery and with 
the emergence of the Third World and its movements under the sign of 
the Conference of Bandung. The 2008 crisis, by its turn, has reinstated 
neoconservative forces, which were already strengthened by the collapse of 
the USSR and by the advent of neoliberalism, led by the United States of 
America.
In this sense, Chinese modernization experience and the 
construction of integration and development processes, articulated under 
the New Silk Road, represent, without a doubt, not just a project, but also 
one of the forces in an international relations field marked by crossroads. 
If the ambitious project of integrating Asia, Europe and Africa manages 
to afford an alternative to capitalism’s central poles and to the Consensus 
of Washington, China will be able to exert a fundamental leading role 
in the twenty-first century. Africa, paradoxically, takes on a decisive role: 
from marginalized continent, it may turn itself into the new frontier of the 
experiences of development and South-South cooperation. The inclusion 
of the African continent within the New Silk Road also represents the 
opportunity to globally shape the initiative and, at the same time, China’s 
role itself in the new global power setting.
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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to analyze Africa’s role in the construction of the 
New Maritime Silk Road. This is just one of the vectors of the ambitious Chinese 
integration project in Asia, Europe and Africa, launched in 2013 under the title 
OBOR Initiative (One Belt, One Road). By overcoming the challenges of national 
reconstruction, China is becoming more assertive and shaping its global integration 
strategy. In this sense, the New Silk Road aggregates the main objectives of China’s 
diplomacy in the twenty-first century, elevating Africa to a springboard condition in 
order for the project to become global.
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